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The Little Phone That Could Ch-Ch-Chroot
Jack Whitter-Jones and Mathew Evans
Abstract—Security testing has been a career path that many are beginning to take. In doing so, security testing can hit the realms of
many different types of engagements, ranging from web, infrastructure and social engineering. With the risk of sabotage, corporate
espionage it has been seen that many organisations are beginning to develop a tactical capability. In doing so, the term ’Red Team’ has
been coined to market such engagements. Red Teaming is the method of having almost free reign towards a target. By doing such an
engagement a target will be able to fully understand the breadth of vulnerabilities facing their organisation. However, Red Teaming can
be an expensive and resource intensive task. Through this paper, it is discussed that it is possible to make a covert disposable phone
to help aide Red Teamer’s with the reconnaissance phase without drawing attention to themselves within a day to day task.
Index Terms—Red Teaming, Disposable Device, Computer Security, Covert, Mobile Security
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
S ECURITY engagements, hacking, penetration testing allencompass the overall posture in how to exploit an
organisations digital system to achieve mission success, may
it be providing an overall security posture or something
more sinister. There is a range of different types of security
engagements can encompass many different areas of secu-
rity. An assessment can encompass, Web Application, Red
Teaming, Infrastructure and Social Engineering Testing. Any
one of these engagement types can cost an extremely large
amount of money, both for the provider and the client. Of
interest to this paper is the Red Team Engagement process.
This paper aims to help develop the area of Red Teaming’s,
physical processes through the development of a covert
phone. The paper is split first for the reasons why we chose
to do build the device, and then the key implementation
of the device and then finally concluding the paper with a
discussion.
1.1 What is Hacking and Red Teaming?
”Hacking” is the term used to describe as, ”to circumvent
security and break into (a network, computer, file, etc.),
usually with malicious intent” [1]. This however, can also be
associated to social engineering. Social engineering is the art
of exploiting a person or persons to gather intelligence for
a missions objective. Red Teaming however, is the process
in which the overall network and staff are tested to better
understand, identifying and assessing vulnerabilities that
face an organisation. Red Teaming can provide an extremely
detailed understanding of the attack surface. This is due to
depth and breadth of a test as they are tailored to a scenario
towards the customers requirements.
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2 DEVICE BUILD
Within this project, the requirement was to distinguish what
was ’expensive’ in which a device for less than £35.00 was a
goal. Additionally, the device would be required to be able
to run the overall architecture specific requirements had to
be met. The following requirements were necessary to be
able to allow for the end implementation:
• Android - Openness for underlying architectures.
• Cheap - Ability to purchase a device for plug and
play features.
• Rootable - The underlying concepts require a
Rootable architecture.
• Deniable - The device must provide a level of deni-
ability to allow the user not to be tied to an engage-
ment.
• Ease of Use - The ability to change, update and
maintain quickly.
Meeting these five requirements allows for a versatile and
almost limitless set of potential outcomes. In addition, the
baseline that it provides can be applied to other Android
based devices with varying ranges of functionality e.g.,
Smart Watches. As stated the phones underlying architec-
ture utilises the Android stack. It is worth noting that this
implementation used was Android Version 6.0.1, Kernel
3.18.19. The base handset was an Alcatel, PIXI Volcano Black
R-B, 4034X, which cost £29.99 during the latter half of 2017.
The Alcatel met the full requirements above. A comparable
setup to the Alcatel phone would be a 3G mobile module,
USB dongle utilised by a Raspberry PI 3. This setup would
cost the same if not more, and would look suspicious when
carried around.
3 IMPLEMENTATION
This section outlines the thought processes and objectives
that were required to be able to implement an architecture
to achieve the projects mission statement, which is a cheap
disposable device, that has an implementation for a high
level of plausible deniability and limiting in evidential in-
tegrity.
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3.1 SELinux
SELinux is prevalent across many Android devices it is
worth providing a high-level background understanding
to it. SELinux is a mandatory access control facility that
provides the overall security architecture for Android. This
is on top of Android’s sandbox and discretionary access con-
trol (DAC). SELinux is required to be utilised almost exclu-
sively across the phones life cycle, thus removing SELinux
isn’t allowed. This is partly down to the requirements of
removing the SELinux implementation within the firmware
of the device, with the added problem of discrediting denia-
bility towards the device operator. SELinux implements two
approaches, enforcement or passive [4].
• Enforcing - SELinux policy is enforced. SELinux de-
nies access based on SELinux policy rules.
• Permissive - SELinux policy is not enforced. SELinux
does not deny access, but denials are logged for
actions that would have been denied if running in
enforcing mode.
To provide further granularity, SELinux provides contextual
security to processes. This is done through security contexts
which can be applied to users and objects, objects are
typically referred to as files. As these files situate within the
Android operating system, persistence is associated to such
files. A objects security context is immutable throughout the
Android architecture. As objects are somewhat immutable,
the removal of SELinux isn’t fully possible as the Android
operating system will re-implement SELinux if the policy or
context is subverted.
3.2 Device Rooting
Rooting the device was straight forward as much of the
work had been done and written up on the XNA website,
which can be found at [6]. Once rooted, the device was
loaded with CyanogenMod version 13. CyanogenMod 13
provided a sustainable base for the base architecture to be
developed on. CyanogenMod is commonly utilised as a
mobile enthusiasts base for many devices during the time
of creating this project. This provides a suitable platform to
build our plausible deniability as anyone carrying such a
device would be considered an advocate for technology.
3.3 CPIO & Chroot
The concept of using a Chroot within an Android is far from
new. There are examples such as NetHunter the Kali install
that uses Chroot [2], and Debian is commonly installed via a
Chroot into Android phones. Additionally, the use of CPIO
archive files to store Linux firmwares is also not new, it is
a common practice used on routers and small embedded
devices.
Chroot give the ability to have a different sub-
system running almost independently. Allowing features
not present in a system to be made available. The choice
to use Tinycorelinux presented a few advantages, over
previous examples that have used Debian or other Linux
distributions. The first major advantage is a drastic size
reduction. A minimum Debian install requires 350mb of
space, a typical minimum install of NetHunter takes 1gb
of space, TinyCoreLinux’s minimum install can be as little
as 32mb [5].
By placing the full distribution into a CPIO format
natively supported by Android, but unsupported by most
mobile forensics packages, it is possible to get a first layer
of protection. CPIO also applies GZ Compression which
protects against data carvers. Finally, to hide the CPIO
without the embedded system being easily found as just
another file. It is stored at the end of the user data partition
using the ”dd” tool, which is also included in Android.
Finally, with SELinux disabled the onboot, the userinit.sh
script can create a memory only temporary filesystem,
extract the Linux sub-system from the hidden CPIO, and
activate the Chroot.
#!/system/bin/sh
init() {
if [ -f "/mnt/blob" ]; then
echo "BLOB Found Updating..."
dd if=/mnt/blob of=/dev/block/mmcblk0p22 bs=10M seek=1;
rm -rf /mnt/blob
echo "Update complete rebooting."
reboot
else
if [ ! -d "/mnt/tc" ]; then mkdir /mnt/tc; chmod 755 /mnt/tc; fi
mount -t tmpfs -o size=100m ext3 /mnt/tc
cd /mnt/tc
dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0p22 bs=10M skip=1 | gzip -d -c | cpio -idm
cat /mnt/tc/opt/core/0 | gzip -d -c | cpio -idm
mount --bind /dev dev
mount --bind /sys sys
mount --bind /proc proc
(nc -s 127.0.0.1 -p 222 -iL /system/bin/sh)&
chroot /mnt/tc /bin/su root /opt/1st.sh
fi
}
Listing 1. Userinit Bash Script
The whole sub-system will be fully loaded before the An-
droid system has finish, allowing for manipulation of fea-
tures before any user can physically interact with the device.
One such feature manipulation is forcefully disabling ADB-
Root and ADB connections, even if the android GUI shows
it be enabled. This adds yet another layer of anti-forensics
protection, and forces investigators to resort to ”chipoff”
techniques if they wish to look at the phone in more detail.
3.4 Functionality
This section outlines the key functionality, that the re-
searchers chose to develop as an initial use case for the
device. Ranging from photo’s both physical and remote,
USB tethering for covert tunnelling and update automation.
3.5 Update and Extract Automation
During the development of the device, updates were re-
quired to allow for further functionality to be developed.
To reduce the time required to implement updates, the
following script was utilised.
./extract-tce.sh $(pwd)/Desktop/tce/deps
cd cpio
find . -print -depth | cpio -vo -H newc | gzip > ../blob
cd ..
cp userinit.sh userinit.tmp
echo init ‘stat --printf=%s blob‘ >> userinit.tmp
adb shell su root chmod a+wx /mnt
adb shell su root chmod a+wx /data/local/userinit.sh
adb push blob /mnt/blob
adb push userinit.tmp /data/local/userinit.sh
adb shell su root /system/bin/sh /data/local/userinit.sh
rm userinit.tmp
echo SSH Password : ‘cat ˜/Desktop/tce/cpio/opt/1st.sh | grep chpasswd‘
Listing 2. Update Bash Script
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Once updates have been repackaged, the automation of
extraction is applied through the extract tce script. This is
how the CPIO is mounted and loaded onto the device.
#!/bin/bash
unpack() {
if [ ! -d /home/x/Desktop/tce/sq ]; then
mkdir /home/x/Desktop/tce/sq
fi
if [ -f $1 ]; then
echo "Unapacking $1"
mount -o loop $1 /home/x/Desktop/tce/sq
cp -rp /home/x/Desktop/tce/sq/* /home/x/Desktop/tce/cpio/.
umount -f /home/x/Desktop/tce/sq
sleep 2;
fi
}
parsedep() {
if [ -f $1.dep ]; then
echo "$1.dep found. parsing...."
while read p; do
echo "[!] $p required."
if [ ! -f $p ]; then
wget http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$p
fi
if [ -f $p ]; then
unpack $p;
fi
if [ ! -f $p.dep ]; then
wget -q http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$p.dep
fi
if [ -f $p.dep ]; then
parsedep $p;
fi
done < $1.dep
fi
}
getOne() {
if [ ! -f $1 ]; then
wget http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$1
fi
if [ -f $1 ]; then
unpack $1;
fi
if [ ! -f $1.dep ]; then
wget -q http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$1.dep
fi
if [ -f $1.dep ]; then
parsedep $1;
fi
}
getAll() {
while read p; do
echo "Getting $p + Dependencies and unpacking to ../cpio"
if [ ! -f $p ]; then
wget http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$p
fi
if [ -f $p ]; then
unpack $p;
fi
if [ ! -f $p.dep ]; then
wget -q http://tinycorelinux.net/9.x/armv7/tcz/$p.dep
fi
if [ -f $p.dep ]; then
parsedep $p;
fi
done < $1
}
cd optional
echo $1
if [ -f "$1" ]; then
getAll $1
else
echo "Getting $1 + Dependencies and unpacking to ../cpio"
getOne $1
fi
Listing 3. Extract TCE Bash Script
3.5.1 USB Tethering
USB Tethering has two main purposes for such a device,
one to provide a utility of deniability when connecting to a
secondary device in the means of charging the device. Sec-
ondly the phone can be tricked into thinking it is charging,
however the phone provides a secondary network interface
for the device to begin transmitting information across its
encrypted pipeline. This functionality can be utilising as a
physical command and control system. The script demon-
strated in Listing 4, illustrates the method in which the
device utilises the USB tethering procedures to allow for
encrypted tunnelling, with an associating termination script
to end the tunnel.
#!/system/bin/sh
prevconfig=$(getprop sys.usb.config)
if [ "${prevconfig}" != "${prevconfig#rndis}" ] ; then
echo ’Is tethering already active?’ >&2
exit 1
fi
echo "${prevconfig}" > /cache/usb_tether_prevconfig
setprop sys.usb.config ’rndis,adb’
until [ "$(getprop sys.usb.state)" = ’rndis,adb’ ] ; do sleep 1 ; done
ip rule add from all lookup main
ip addr flush dev rndis0
ip addr add 172.31.1.1/24 dev rndis0
ip link set rndis0 up
iptables -t nat -I POSTROUTING 1 -o rndis0 -j MASQUERADE
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
dnsmasq --pid-file=/cache/usb_tether_dnsmasq.pid --interface=rndis0 --bind-
interfaces --bogus-priv --filterwin2k --no-resolv --domain-needed --server
=8.8.8.8 --server=8.8.4.4 --cache-size=1000 --dhcp-range
=172.31.1.2,172.31.1.253,255.255.255.0,172.31.1.255 --dhcp-lease-max=253 --
dhcp-authoritative --dhcp-leasefile=/cache/usb_tether_dnsmasq.leases < /dev/
null
Listing 4. USB Tethering Start Bash Script
#!/system/bin/sh
if [ ! -f /cache/usb_tether_prevconfig ] ; then
echo ’/cache/usb_tether_prevconfig not found. Is tethering really active?’ >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -f /cache/usb_tether_dnsmasq.pid ] ; then
kill "$(cat /cache/usb_tether_dnsmasq.pid)"
rm /cache/usb_tether_dnsmasq.pid
fi
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
iptables -t nat -D POSTROUTING 1
ip link set rndis0 down
ip addr flush dev rndis0
ip rule del from all lookup main
setprop sys.usb.config "$(cat /cache/usb_tether_prevconfig)"
rm /cache/usb_tether_prevconfig
while [ "$(getprop sys.usb.state)" = ’rndis,adb’ ] ; do sleep 1 ; done
Listing 5. USB Tethering Stop Bash Script
3.5.2 Reader
Reader is an essential script for capturing gesture movement
via the device’s screen. Implementing the feature allows for
a discrete method for activating different controls across
the phone e.g., taking an image, video, etc. The Reader
functionality allows for this ability through a constant listen
on the devices input sensors, in doing so a value must be
met before further functionality is utilised.
#! /bin/env python
import struct
import time
import sys
import os
infile_path = "/dev/input/event" + (sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else "0")
#long int, long int, unsigned short, unsigned short, unsigned int
FORMAT = ’llHHI’
EVENT_SIZE = struct.calcsize(FORMAT)
#open file in binary mode
in_file = open(infile_path, "rb")
event = in_file.read(EVENT_SIZE)
check = False
lock = False
while event:
print(check)
(tv_sec, tv_usec, type, code, value) = struct.unpack(FORMAT, event)
if type != 0 or code != 0 or value != 0:
print("Event type %u, code %u, value %u at %d.%d" % \
(type, code, value, tv_sec, tv_usec))
else:
# Events with code, type and value == 0 are "separator" events
print("===========================================")
event = in_file.read(EVENT_SIZE)
if type == 3 and code == 53 and value == 400:
check = True
print(check)
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if check == True:
if type == 3 and code == 53 and value in range(200,226):
check = False
os.system(’./photo.sh’)
os.execv(__file__, sys.argv)
in_file.close()
Listing 6. Reader Python Script
3.5.3 Photo
Photo functionality was the first initial potential for the
device. This provides an excellent case study for any red
teaming operator to acquire sensitive material within re-
stricted areas. An assumption is made that the operator
would be able to handle the phone while walking. The
photo script works on the principle of an operator swiping
there any finger across part of the screen. The reader script
will interpret this gesture and trigger the camera.
#!/bin/sh
sh-a input swipe 1 330 1 1
BRIGHT=$(cat /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness)
echo 0 > /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness
sh-a am start -a android.media.action.STILL_IMAGE_CAMERA
echo 0 > /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness
sleep 1
sh-a input keyevent 27
sleep 3
kill -9 ‘ps aux | grep snap | awk ’{split($0,a," "); print a[1]}’| head -n 1‘
IMG=$(sh-a ls -s /sdcard/DCIM/camera|tail -n 1|awk ’{split($0,a," "); print a[2]}’)
#echo moving $IMG to chroot
sh-a mv /sdcard/DCIM/camera/$IMG /mnt/tc/opt/core/root/.
#echo $BRIGHT > /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness
sh-a input keyevent KEYCODE_POWER
Listing 7. Photo Bash Script
3.5.4 Remote Photo
As stated above, the photo potential is an excellent task to
achieve as it provides that initial case study for the phone.
However, there might be times in which an operator won’t
be able to trigger the gesture as it could draw attention to
themselves. Instead, a remote operator will be able to trigger
the phone without enabling the screen or camera to take an
image within the direction the camera (both front and back)
is facing. This then allows them to pass the information
through an SSH tunnel that has been established to connect
to the phone.
#!/bin/sh
sh-a input keyevent KEYCODE_POWER
sh-a input swipe 1 330 1 1
BRIGHT=$(cat /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness)
echo 0 > /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness
sh-a am start -a android.media.action.STILL_IMAGE_CAMERA
sleep 1
sh-a input keyevent 27
sleep 3
kill -9 ‘ps aux | grep snap | awk ’{split($0,a," "); print a[1]}’| head -n 1‘
IMG=$(sh-a ls -s /sdcard/DCIM/camera|tail -n 1|awk ’{split($0,a," "); print a[2]}’)
echo moving $IMG to chroot
sh-a mv /sdcard/DCIM/camera/$IMG /mnt/tc/opt/core/root/.
echo $BRIGHT > /sys/devices/platform/leds-mt65xx/leds/lcd-backlight/brightness
sh-a input keyevent KEYCODE_POWER
Listing 8. Remote Photo Bash Script
4 CONCLUSION
A covert device has many applications. With the rise of
red teaming, purple teaming and other operations which
involve large moving parts within the field of Cyber secu-
rity cheap disposable devices become significantly versatile
within an operators arsenal. The discussed device meets the
target operators needs by being relatively cheap, aesthet-
ically pleasing and allowing for plausible deniability. The
paper has only touched on what can be done within the
field of covert operations utilising cheap hardware and what
functionality could be utilised. It is theoretically plausible to
be able to utilise all the phones capabilities remotely and
covertly.
APPENDIX A
ANTI-FORENSICS
An approachwas taken within the phone to reduce the lead-
ing mobile forensic investigation software that is used by
large organisations, research institutes and law enforcement
agencies. Designing the phone to protect itself against foren-
sic capabilities would have multiple benefits e.g., plausible
deniability, limited evidential integrity. It is assumed that a
devices contents that changes must be known to rule out of
an investigation. As the device utilises hidden partitions the
phone utilises a method of integrity disruption. In doing so
creates different hash values for each image of the phone,
thus disrupting the imaging process. This is in tandem with
the utilisation of hidden partitions and the use of a CPIO as
outlined in section 3.3.
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